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Abstract
This paper offers an alternative rationalization for opportunistic behaviour
i.e., a gradual disinflation strategy where policymakers react asymmetrically
to supply shocks, opting to disinflate only in recessionary period. Specifically,
we show that adaptive expectations combined with asymmetry in the Phillips
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curve of a specific sort together provide an optimizing justification for oppor-
tunism. However, the empirical basis for these conditions to be satisfied in the
current low-inflation context of most OECD countries remains however to be
established.
JEL classifications: E52; E58
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I Introduction
During the 1990s many central banks pursued monetary policies committed to keeping
inflation at or close to a target, with a secondary objective of stabilising output. Under
rational expectations with a standard Phillips curve, such policies can be shown to be
optimal. This principle has been challenged in the 1990s, somewhat surprisingly, by
senior policymakers at the Fed, who have argued for ‘opportunism’ in monetary policy
and have opposed the setting of a single central inflation target.1 Their argument
is that the Fed should move towards its long-run ambitions for inflation gradually
and exploit opportunities for inflation reductions as they occur, for example through
favourable supply shocks.
The ‘opportunistic’ approach to monetary policy can be neatly divided into two
halves. First and foremost, there is the idea of delay: one should not pursue a target
1For academic literature see Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000).
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for inflation that is too ambitious in the short run – it is ‘impractical’. Rather
one should pursue a practical target for inflation that is within grasp in the short
term- an interim target. Secondly, there is the idea of asymmetry: one acts to reduce
inflation when the economy is already producing lower inflation via a favourable burst
of circumstances (a ‘good supply shock’).2 One does not try to reduce inflation when
inflation is strengthening; rather one aims to dampen it then – to ‘hold the fort’ as
it were.3
For the process of disinflation from high (double digit) initial levels of inflation
such ideas have been widely defended. However, in the conditions of the 1990s when
inflation was already well within single digits, they seem rather surprising. Yet in the
not so distant past, the late 1990s, there has been a recrudescence of these ideas in
Federal Reserve pronouncements (see Meyer (1996) and Blinder (1997)). These ideas
do seem incongruous in the light of optimising agents using information efficiently
and a social objective function derived from these agents’ utility. Nevertheless, it is
only right to examine such claims carefully when they emanate from the world’s most
2We abstract from demand shocks because both the opportunistic and deliberate policymaker
will fully neutralise the influence of those shocks. Thus, excluding demand shocks does not alter our
results; their introduction is an uninteresting complication in the model.
3These ideas have a long history in central banking practice and advice to central banks. For
example the first was espoused by the Bundesbank in the 1980s in its idea of ‘avoidable inflation’
while the second similarly has deep roots in central banking tactics.
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powerful central bank.
This paper offers an alternative rationalization for opportunistic behaviour –
alternative, that is, to the one given by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002).4 Specifically,
we show that adaptive expectations combined with asymmetry in the Phillips curve
of a specific sort (i.e., a nonlinear effect of the shock on the position of the Phillips
curve trade-off) together provide an optimizing justification for opportunism. Here
adaptive inflation expectations provides the justification for delay in asserting the
ultimate inflation target i.e., it acts as a proxy for market participants’ learning in
a context of uncertainty regarding policymakers’ tastes and objectives. Nevertheless,
the empirical basis for these conditions in the current low-inflation context of most
OECD countries remains to be established. To anticipate our main conclusions,
we find that rigorous defence of the opportunitic strategy can be mounted even if
its empirical foundations may not obviously be robust. In section II we derive an
optimal inflation response when the policymaker is opportunistic. The implications
of opportunism are also explored. Section III seeks a set of sufficient conditions
under which the opportunistic strategy is optimal for a central bank maximising the
4Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) specify a loss function for the policymaker that can be thought of
as incurring a first-order loss from output deviation, and yet only a second-order loss from inflation
deviations when inflation is close to its target. Hence when inflation is moderate policymakers refrain
from inducing the loss in output but rather wait for favourable exogenous shocks to bring inflation
down towards their long-term target.
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preferences of the representative agent.5 Section IV provides concluding remarks.
II Opportunistic Inflation Response
The treatment of inflation targeting under commitment follows Svensson (1997). The
short-run Phillips curve is
yt = ρyt−1 + α (pit − piet) + ut, (2.1)
where yt is the output gap in period t, α and ρ are constants (α > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1), pit
is the inflation rate, piet denotes expectations conditional upon information available
in period t− 1, and ut is iid error, normally distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2u. The private sector has rational expectations; that is,
piet = Et−1pit, (2.2)
Now suppose that there is a commitment mechanism, so that the central bank
can commit to the optimal rule. Under commitment, the optimal rule under inflation
targeting is
pit = piet + but, (2.3)
5Plainly these are ad hoc set-ups under which opportunism may be justified. However we believe
it is of some interest to see whether opportunism can be justified under the demanding requirements
of optimality.
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where, inflation is independent of the lagged output gap and only depends on the new
information that has arrived after the private sector formed its expectations. Thus,
(2.1)—(2.3) represent the constraints facing the central bank. The central bank’s
objective under opportunistic disinflation strategy is given by
V (yt−1) = Et−1 minπet , πt
{1
2
[(
pit − piTt
)2 + λ (yt)2]+ βV (yt)} , (2.4)
where λ > 0 is the relative weight on output-gap stabilization, β is the discount
factor and piTt is the intermediate target for inflation. In addition the model includes
an equation describing the determination of the intermediate target as a function of
the underlying supply shock and a weighted average of past inflation and the long-run
target for inflation. In other words we assume that policymakers incentive to deflate
is a nonlinear function of the underlying supply shock i.e.,
∆piTt = −δ (eγut−1)− φ
(
piTt−1 − pi⋆
)+ δ (e γ2σ2u2 )
or
piTt = pi⋆ − δ
∞∑
i=0
(1− φ)i eγut−1−i + δφ
(
eγ
2σ2u
2
)
(2.5)
where δ, φ, γ > 0. Thus, the intermediate target will almost always lie between
the inherited inflation target (piTt−1) and the long-run target (pi⋆).6 Only when a
exceptionally bad shock (very very low eγut−1) hits the economy it would slightly
6The key feature of the interim target is that it exhibits path dependence i.e., allows the poli-
cymaker to react differently to a given level of inflation depending on the prior history of inflation
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raise the interim target. This is part of the opportunism story really- that you give
a bit on the target when times are really bad. The central bank is, for simplicity,
assumed to have perfect control over the inflation rate pit. It sets the inflation rate
in each period after having observed the current value of the supply shock ut. This
is a dynamic programming problem with one state variable, yt−1, and two control
variables, pit and piet . For the linear-quadratic problem such as ours, V (yt) must also
be quadratic. Thus, the indirect loss function can be written as
V (yt−1) = γ0 + γ1yt−1 + 12γ2y
2
t−1, (2.6)
so that V ′ (yt−1) = γ1 + γ2yt−1 and γ′is are the undetermined coefficients. Using this
condition together with Eqs. (2.1)—(2.3), we obtain the solution for inflation as:
pit = φpi⋆ + (1− φ)piTt−1 − δ (eγut−1) + δ
(
eγ
2σ2u
2
)
−
[ α (βγ2 + λ)
1 + α2 (βγ2 + λ)
]
ut (2.7)
where γ2 = λρ21−βρ2 can be derived by exploiting the Envelope theorem. Eq.(2.7) is the
optimal feedback rule for a opportunistic central banker under commitment expressed
as a function of the parameters of the model and the coefficient, γ2. Note that the
inflation response to supply shocks under opportunism is strictly concave i.e., one
acts to reduce inflation when the economy is already producing lower inflation via
a favourable burst of circumstances (a ‘good supply shock’). One does not try to
itself (see Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002). Also note from Eq. (2.5) that in the long-run the interim
target converges to the long-run target i.e., when supply shocks are zero, piTt = pi⋆.
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reduce inflation when inflation is strengthening; rather one aims to dampen it then-
to ‘hold the fort’ as it were. In the next section we discuss how such a set-up could
be justified as welfare-maximising.
III A Sufficient set of conditions for the oppor-
tunistic strategy
The first condition we suggest is adaptive inflation expectations; this provides the
justification for delay in asserting the ultimate inflation target. When expectations
are adaptive, inflation reduction requires a transitional cost in terms of lost output.
Hence, authorities wait for favourable supply shocks to bring inflation down rather
than engineer a downturn; in this way the transitional cost can be lowered or even
eliminated as output need not fall below its natural rate. This is a well-known part
of the justification for opportunism, and we do not say more here.7
To justify the asymmetry in the central bank’s actions, it would be possible to
appeal to asymmetric preferences of the central bank itself. There is some evidence of
this (see Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2003). However, for optimality such bank pref-
erence asymmetry would have to be deriveable in some way from the preferences of
households. This would require a more complete model linking household consump-
7See Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and Minford and Srinivasan (2003) for example.
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tion and leisure to output and inflation. While such derivations exist (see Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1999) they are generally carried out by second order Taylor series
expansions symmetrically around the steady state.8 Plainly if nonlinearities exist
within the model, even though under standard utility functions they do not exist at
the level of household preferences over consumption and leisure, it could in principle
be possible to derive an asymmetric representation of bank preferences over inflation
and output. Doing so is however an ambitious task, not attempted before and not
attempted here either.
Instead we appeal to asymmetry in the Phillips curve itself. Such asymmetry has
a long empirical and theoretical history. Empirically, Phillip’s original paper showed
clear signs of asymmetry in the effects on wage inflation of rising unemployment and
subsequent authors have periodically found the same (see Laxton et al., 1999). A
nonlinear Phillips curve thus provides a rationale for asymmetry even when the poli-
cymaker’s preferences are quadratic. The point is that with a nonlinear Phillips curve
the sacrifice ratio is not independent of the size of an intended change in inflation- it
rises as the economy goes further into recession. This suggests that inflation should
be reduced more when the economy is in an expansionary mode induced by favourable
supply shocks.
8We implicitly assume some such approximation as the basis for using quadratic central bank
preferences.
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Figure 1: Optimal Inflation response when the Phillips curve is Nonlinear
We proceed as follows. We assume that the Phillips curve is linear but the effect of
the shock itself on the position of the trade-off is nonlinear. We use this formulation
as a tractable representation of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve. Figure 1 plots the
optimal inflation response when the Phillips curve is nonlinear and the effect of the
shock ‘ut’ on the position of the trade-off is nonlinear.9 The concentric ellipse in
Figure 1 is the central bank’s indifference curve, with ‘B’ denoting the ‘bliss point’.
The tangency points of the central bank’s indifference curve with the Phillips curve
9This later assumption is crucial for obtaining a concave inflation response in Figure 1. The
Phillips curve in Figure 1 is given by pit = α (eβyt−ut − 1). The objective function is a quadratic in
both pit and yt. If the shock to the Phillips curve is linear i.e., pit = α (eβyt − 1) + ut, this makes
the optimal reaction convex.
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trace out an inflation response of just the asymmetric sort we seek; of course it
can only be done numerically.10 A nonlinear Phillips curve with quadratic central
bank preferences does not yield a closed-form solution for inflation and must be
evaluated numerically – see Orphanides and Wieland (2000). However it can be
shown numerically that the optimal reaction function will be nonlinear, with the
approximate form: pit = pi⋆ − a (eγut − 1) . This closed form solution is obtained
from the assumption we now make. We assume the following functional form for the
Phillips curve:
yt = ρyt−1 + α (pit − piet) +
(
ebut − 1) , (3.1)
where b is a positive constant and Eq.(3.1) is the short-run Phillips curve where
output is assumed to respond asymmetrically to supply disturbances. In addition we
assume that expectations of inflation rate are adaptive and are determined by
piet − piet−1 = a
(
pit−1 − piet−1
) = apit−11− (1− a)L , (3.2)
where 0 < a < 1 and L is the lag operator. Thus, the decision problem of the central
bank can be expressed as
V (yt−1) = Et−1 minπt

1
2
[(pit − pi⋆)2 + λ (yt)2]
+(τ 0 + τ 1yt−1) (pit − pi⋆) + βV (yt)
 , (3.3)
10It is clear from the figure that when there is a positive supply shock (ut) inflation is adjusted
downwards while it stays put when we have a negative shock.
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where τ 0, τ 1 are constant parameters of a Walsh (1995) inflation contract which is
designed to eliminate the state-dependent inflation bias that comes from the inability
to commit under adaptive expectations. Here the minimization in period t is subject
to Eqs.(3.1) and (3.2). The first-order condition from Eq.(3.3) with respect to pit,
yields:
pit = pi⋆ − λα (yt)− αβ [γ1 + γ2 (yt)]− (τ 0 + τ 1yt−1) (3.4)
Substituting Eq.(3.1) for yt and Eq.(3.2) for piet in Eq.(3.4) and by continuous
backward substitution we have:
pit = c−
(
τ 0 + τ 1
∑∞
i=0 kiyt−1−i
1 + α2 (βγ2 + λ)
)
− d
(
ρ
∞∑
i=0
kiyt−1−i +
∞∑
i=0
ki
(
ebut−i − 1)) (3.5)
where k = ( a1−(1−a)L) ( α2(βγ2+λ)1+α2(βγ2+λ)), c = pi⋆ − βγ1α and d = ( α(βγ2+λ)1+α2(βγ2+λ)). The γ′is
the undetermined coefficients can be derived by making use of the Envelope theorem.
Eq.(3.5) is the optimal feedback rule for inflation under discretion when the effect
of the shock on the position of the Phillips curve trade-off is nonlinear. Following
Svensson (1997) the state-dependent inflation bias in Eq.(3.5) can be removed by
choosing appropriate values for the τ ′is. What we have discovered is that our proxy
for the nonlinearity of the Phillips curve, a nonlinear effect of the shock on the
position of the Phillips curve trade-off, yields along with adaptive expectations an
optimally opportunistic inflation response. In other words Eq.(3.5) has the same
form as Eq.(2.7) i.e., when there is a positive supply shock the inflation is adjusted
downwards while it stays put when we have negative supply shocks.
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How strong is the justification for these assumptions? On the one hand, the as-
sumption of adaptive expectations is presumably to be justified as an approximation
to rational learning (Friedman, 1979). On the other hand, it is not clear why learning
should take this form during an episode of inflation stabilisation when inflation is
already moderate and policymakers have credibility (such as one might argue is the
case today in most OECD countries). Secondly, as we noted above, there is a long
history of defending and finding nonlinearity in the Phillips curve although the theo-
retical and empirical evidence for such nonlinearities are mixed.11 Furthermore, one
also needs that the shock be nonlinear in its shift effect. This nonlinear shift effect
implies that supply shocks have larger effects on inflation when negative than when
positive; this specific requirement is plainly a source of potential non-robustness. In
sum, the empirical basis for these assumptions is mixed.
IV Conclusion
This paper offers an alternative rationalization for opportunistic behaviour i.e., a
gradual disinflation strategy where policymakers react asymmetrically to supply shocks,
opting to disinflate only in recessionary period. Under rational expectations with a
standard (linear) Phillips curve, such policies can be shown to be suboptimal (see
11Gordon (1997) maintains that in the US the Phillips curve is linear while Laxton et al., (1999)
have presented evidence suggesting a convex shape.
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Minford and Srinivasan, 2003). Thus opportunism poses a theoretical puzzle, which
this paper attempts to resolve by finding a set of sufficient conditions under which
it is optimal. We showed that adaptive expectations combined with asymmetry in
the Phillips curve of a specific sort (i.e., a nonlinear effect of the shock on the posi-
tion of the Phillips curve trade-off) together provide an optimising justification for
opportunism. Although the set of conditions examined are theoretically feasible the
empirical basis for these in the current low-inflation context of most OECD countries
remains however to be established.
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